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The History and Challenges of Cohesion Policy* 
 
Carolyn Marie Dudek 
Hofstra University 
 
 
 Regional economic disequilibria was viewed as both an obstacle to and result of integration 
(European Commission 1965; European Commission 1962; European Commission 1969). Even within 
the Treaty of Rome, the Community tried to establish mechanisms to alleviate regional inequality. 
However, it was not until 1975 that the main mechanism of regional policy was established as a result of 
British and Irish enlargement: the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF).  Since then, cohesion 
policy has become a significant EU expenditure accounting for €347bn, or 35.7% of the total EU 
budget for 2007-13(European Commission Regional Policy-Info Regio 2012). It has also become a key 
policy linked to enlargement.  
 The underlying principle of cohesion policy assumes that the market alone cannot solve 
development problems and therefore government intervention is needed. This notion is in direct contrast 
to the underlying principle of EU competition policy, which asserts that the free market can solve 
economic development problems (Meadows, interview by author, 2003). The logic underlying cohesion 
policy is not only counter to EU competition policy, but also regulatory policies. Unlike other EU 
policies, cohesion policy is not a sectoral policy, but rather territorial in nature (Leonardi, 2006). Thus at 
times EU regulatory policy has also unintentionally worked counter to the goals of regional policy, 
sometimes disadvantaging poorer regions (Dudek, 2005).  
 As the Community has sought to ameliorate regional disparities, it meant that all levels of 
government: local, regional, national and supranational would need to be involved, however, member 
states have different territorial governance and European regional development programs have to varying 
degrees impacted the relationship and policy responsibility of different levels of government (Leonardi, 
2006; Bachtler and Michie 1993; Marks, 1993). The very nature of regional development policy has 
provoked a re-examination of subsidiarity, or which level of government is the lowest and most 
appropriate level. The discussion of policy formulation and implementation at the lowest level possible 
also addresses the issue of the democratic deficit. Some argue that the closer government is to the people 
the more responsive and representative it is. Democracy, however, also implies that public funds are used 
in a transparent way and for public rather than private good. Yet, as we examine the history and current 
situation of EU regional funds we find that corruption and misuse still abound. Thus, to understand the 
history of regional policy it is imperative to look at the major transformations of the policy, how regional 
policy has impacted subsidiarity and the quality of democracy, become an important instrument of 
enlargement and contradicted or conflicted with other EU policies. 
 
Subsidiarity and The History of Cohesion Policy  
 The Treaty of Rome pointed out the problem of regional economic disparities across the six 
original members. In the preamble of the treaty signatory members stated they were, “Anxious to 
strengthen the unity of their economies and to ensure their harmonious development by reducing the 
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differences existing between the various regions and the backwardness of the less favoured regions.” 
(European Economic Community 1957). As a result the treaty created three instruments to address 
regional disparities: the European Social Fund (ESF), the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee 
Fund (EAGGF) and the European Investment Bank (EIB). ESF focused on providing employment 
opportunity and retraining. The Guarantee portion of EAGGF was used to buy and store surplus produce 
and to encourage agricultural exports (McCormick 2004), whereas, guidance refers to funds utilized to 
improve the living and working conditions of farmers. EIB was to help fund “projects for developing less 
developed regions”(Treaty of Rome, Article 130a) and many projects went to rural regions. The focus of 
these funds demonstrates that in the earlier days of the Community there was strong emphasis on 
developing Common Agricultural Policy and these funds predominantly went to improving rural areas 
(Dall’Erba 2003). 
In the 1960s the Commission began to show greater concern for regional economic disparities 
and in 1962 produced an Action Program, 1965 a Memorandum of Regional Problems and in 1969 a 
Memorandum on Regional Policy. In particular the 1969 Memorandum asserted that, “In many fields the 
establishment of the common market gives rise to special problems.  It is only logical to try and solve 
these problems by joint efforts” (European Commission 1969:1). The memoranda recommended 
coordination of national and EU policies to address regional disequilibria.  
 It was not until the accession of the UK, Ireland and Denmark in 1973 that regional policy was 
firmly established with the creation of the ERDF. This first Community enlargement happened at the 
same time as the first oil shock and included a country like Ireland that was at the time composed mostly 
of the rural periphery. ERDF, however, was created to allay British discontent over not receiving the 
benefits of CAP as compared to more agricultural countries. Thus, ERDF became a concession in order 
for the UK to join and was embedded within their accession agreement. The initial creation of ERDF in 
1975, however, was not intended to decrease the economic and structural backwardness of less fortunate 
regions of Europe, but rather to augment the central budgets of certain countries. Many scholars suggest 
cohesion policy was seen as a side-payment in order for lesser-developed countries to sign onto the single 
market and later European Monetary Union (EMU) (Pollack 1995; Allen 2000; Morata and Munoz 1996).  
The membership of Spain and Portugal in 1986, adding two much poorer members, changed the balance 
of budgetary priorities in the EC and regional development became a much larger policy (Laffan and 
Shackelton 2000). Both Spain and Portugal had significant regional economic disparities and were able to 
gain influence within the EC to promote the notion of cohesion (Manzella and Mendez 2009).  
Although regional economic disequilibria were recognized in the Treaty of Rome, cohesion was 
given a legal basis with the Single European Act (SEA) signed just after Iberian enlargement. Article 
130a of the SEA stated:  
In order to promote its overall harmonious development, the Community shall develop and 
pursue its actions leading to the strengthening of its economic and social cohesion. In 
particular the Community shall aim at reducing disparities between the various regions and 
the backwardness of the least-favoured regions. 
The main policy instruments to address cohesion were three Structural Funds: the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF), the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund-Guidance Section 
(EAGGF) and the European Social Fund (ESF). Prior to 1989, structural funds were doled out to specific 
projects that were co-financed and member states played a major role in the decision to create and 
implement projects. Within the Regional Policy DG it became clear that a case by case distribution of 
projects was not adequate to promote the wealth generating capacity of worse off regions (Meadows, 
interview by author, 2003). In 1988, following the introduction of cohesion in the SEA, emerged a 
significant reform of regional policy and its main budgetary elements. The reform’s main architect was 
Commission President Jacques Delors and the Delors-1 package of February 1988 was a deal that set up 
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the general regulatory guidelines of the new Cohesion policy. The Delors-1 package doubled the amount 
of structural funds for the 1989-1992 program in order to help poorer regions that would not share the 
same benefits as richer regions (Laffan and Shackelton 2000). Moreover, the doubling of structural funds 
came to the detriment of cohesion funds, which national governments controlled and distributed. Delors 
wanted a greater inclusion of regional and local governments in regional development policy.  
A key component of the Delors-1 package was the Commission’s introduction of the “principle of 
partnership”.  This principle was to promote the participation of regional or local authorities in the 
adoption and implementation of regional policies made possible through EU co-financing. The underlying 
assumption was that regional policy makers would be more adept at evaluating their regional economies 
and would be better able to determine the advancements necessary to improve conditions in their region; 
thus making EU regional policies more efficient and effective.  In addition, the Commission had hoped to 
lessen regional dependence on national government resources and to allow regional actors greater 
discretion (Smyrl 1997).  
 A schism within the Commission emerged regarding what role subnational governments should 
play or in other words to what extent partnership should be applied. Not only was the 1988 reform 
strongly challenged within the Commission it was also contested across member states. The Commission 
did not work as a unitary actor, but rather a small group, with the support of then Commission President 
Jacques Delors, created the basis of the reform(Hooghe 1997). Other DGs that the reform affected 
resented being forced to conform to these changes (Hooghe 1997). The group surrounding Delors, who 
were the innovators of the reform, established DG XXII Coordination of Structural Policy which would 
coordinate funds in such a way as to “maximize subnational input in structural programming” to facilitate 
stronger relations between regional/local authorities and the EU (Hooghe 1997:93). Counter to DG XXII, 
the Regional Policy DG desired a more flexible approach, whereby the extent to which subnational 
governments would participate in the system would not be uniform across all member states. By 1992, the 
Regional Policy DG’s approach prevailed and DG XXII was eliminated. 
Hooghe (1997) asserts that pressure to not achieve fully the partnership principle and empower 
regional-EU relations had more to do with internal divisions in the Commission regarding how to deal 
with subnational administrations. On the other hand, others suggest that the realization of the “partnership 
principle” has varied across countries and has been limited due to internal member state practices 
(Meadows, interview by author, 2003; White, interview by author, 2003). It seems that constitutional 
constraints and national government attempts to preclude regional governments from gaining more 
autonomy inhibited the realization of partnership (Dudek 2005). 
The partnership principle can be seen as an attempt to promote subsidiarity, which is a principle 
that addresses the distribution of responsibilities among levels of government.  The term subsidiarity 
stems from Catholic social thought and has influenced the connotation of federalism in continental 
Europe (Peters 1992; Curzio 1997).  Peters (1992) asserts that the principle of subsidiarity in the context 
of the European Community leaves most responsibilities to national and sub-national governments. 
According to Olsen (1995), the principle of subsidiarity suggests that a problem should be solved at the 
lowest level capable of doing so effectively.  This implies that the smallest possible unit should be 
responsible for carrying out social and political tasks.  Subsidiarity, in principle, suggests that the EU can 
give considerable responsibility to sub-national governments.  If this is the case, then the EU and its 
application of subsidiarity and the partnership principle should promote decentralization and further free 
sub-national governments from national and supranational infringement upon their policy-making and 
implementing abilities.  
One perspective of the 1988 reform of regional development policy views the introduction of 
structural funds and the “partnership principle” as a way of strengthening the influence of regions within 
their respective nation-states and throughout Europe.  Scholars suggest that the EU and structural funds 
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would augment the preexisting movement toward decentralization, especially since structural funds 
provide regional governments with resources to implement their own policies (Marks 1993; Conzelman 
1995; Kohler-Koch 1995; Sharpe 1993; Meny and Wright 1985).  In this view, the EU will become a 
“Europe of the Regions”, whereby the traditional nation-state breaks down and regions become the 
primary units below the EU (Marks 1992; Marks 1993; Hooghe and Marks 1996; Anderson 1992).  
Structural funds, theoretically, can affect decentralization.  These funds reallocate money from 
the EU to underdeveloped regions within member states, thus enabling regional governments to create 
and implement their own development policies.  These plans are supposedly independent of the national 
government. The multi-level governance model of the EU suggests that structural funds involve a 
simultaneous centralization of power to the EU level and decentralization of power to sub-national 
governments (Marks 1993; Hooghe and Marks 1996; Hooghe and Marks 2001). This thesis purports that 
the Commission plays an increasing role supporting and promoting the interests of sub-national 
governments.  In effect, a new partnership is created between the EU and sub-national regions allowing 
regional governments to assert their autonomy and to advance decentralization (Conzelman 1995; Marks 
1993). 
It may appear that the centralizing tendencies of integration and decentralization within nation-
states are incompatible trends.  However, as centralization occurs above the nation-state, decentralization 
within the nation-state can alleviate the tensions of integration.  For example, although regulation and 
standardization throughout Europe is perceived as a threat to cultural identities and traditions, the 
simultaneous empowerment of regions preserves cultures and traditions and with certain concessions both 
the supranational and regional levels of governance can profit.  Strengthening of regions through EU 
mechanisms can ameliorate the tensions concerning regional and national identities in the face of 
integration.   
The partnership principle, however, does not address the existence of government actions and 
conceptualizations of the state that will retard or even prohibit the increase in regional governments 
having a greater say in development policy.  In particular, it does not take into account the distribution of 
competencies between the national and regional governments and the difference in political weight of 
regions within a state. Internal pressures from within the Commission advocated a stronger role for 
regions in order to improve the effectiveness of funds. In the end, however, coordination between regions 
and the Commission was not as effective and far-reaching as assumed due to constitutional constraints 
within member states and member states’ jealousies regarding sovereignty and tensions among 
government levels (Meadows, interview by author, 2003).  
The wording of the partnership principle, although optimistic to achieve more participation of 
lower levels of government, still leaves the final say to member states and is dependent upon their 
respective institutional structure (Colino 1996;  Dudek 2001). As a result, member states have attempted 
to maintain their sovereignty over their territorial administrations. There often is a hierarchy between the 
national and regional levels of government making the national government the main legislator and 
executive of regional policies. On the other hand, many EU member states have increased devolution of 
policy competencies to lower levels of government, making decentralization a major trend in European 
politics (Sharpe 1993; Leonardi and Nanetti 1990). Devolution has promoted greater coordination 
between levels of government regarding regional policy, but in many member states much more needs to 
be done. 
Barriers to coordination among levels of government are intensified when a policy area was once 
the domain of the national government. For instance, regional development policies existed at the national 
level prior to EU involvement; yet, some forms of social policy, such as the 1997 EU Employment 
Policy, which supported national labour markets, had not existed at the national level before. Thus, 
tensions may be less in some policy areas, which were not part of the national governments’ domain, 
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whereas, regional policy, which traditionally was the responsibility of national governments can create 
tension as national governments struggle to maintain their competencies
†
.  
Examining individual countries it becomes clear that each state has a different way of organizing 
territorial administrations. For example, the UK, Ireland and Portugal, traditionally unitary states, have 
maintained mechanisms to keep control of central authorities. In the UK there is little low level taxation 
and although the EU has pushed to give more powers to counties, this has not been achieved (White, 
interview by author, 2003). One instance is the way in which British Regional Development Authorities 
operate, whereby in actuality they are ultimately responsible to Whitehall. Similarly, in Portugal regional 
authorities are relatively weak compared to their regional counterparts in other member states and must 
report to Lisbon regarding regional development policy implementation. Ireland as well manages the 
implementation of structural funds mostly from the central government. Conversely, France has made a 
genuine attempt to decentralize and to give more responsibility to the prefects (Charles White, interview 
by author,  2003). Coordination between the Regional Policy DG and the regions varies across member 
states depending upon the extent to which regions have policy-making and implementation competencies.  
Sometimes coordination among the Commission, member states and regions can be difficult since 
they have different priorities and goals than the Commission. For instance, member state elected officials 
need to provide benefits to their constituencies to maintain substantive legitimacy, which will hopefully 
ultimately keep them in office. As a result, member states will either bend their policies to fit those of the 
EU or bend EU policies to fit their own (Meadows, interview by author, 2003). Although EU policies 
attempt to influence or change member state practices, member states also try to maintain their own 
policies, and as a result little change in policy may actually occur. For example, the EU may make a 
request for a member state to adopt a policy initiative. The member state will then dialogue with the EU 
as to how the policy will be adopted. In the end, as a result of compromise, emerges a watered down 
version of the EU’s original policy that looks more like the member state’s original policy. The 
appearance is that the member state has adopted an EU policy, but in reality little change has really 
occurred (Meadows, interview by author, 2003). 
Resistance to directives from Brussels can weaken the coordination of regional policies among 
EU regions and member states. Often times EU initiatives run counter to national and regional 
governments’ views on how to achieve development (White 2003). When regional and national 
governments have their own vision of how policy goals should be achieved this can clash with European 
policies. Thus, often times the Court of Auditors may find that policies did not conform to the EU’s 
mandate, however, in actuality it was just that national and regional governments felt that certain policy 
goals should be achieved in a different way. For instance, the Natura 2000 program stipulates that regions 
need to put aside a certain amount of land for environmentally protected areas as a condition for receiving 
funds. The Natura 2000 program’s stipulations have significant implications for regional and national 
leaders since they are unable to develop as they deem appropriate (White, interview by author, 2003). As 
a result, however, the EU is able to achieve its policy goals without a working coordination with member 
states, but rather with a EU legal mandate. 
Although member states often try to maintain authority over their territory and resist direct EU 
intervention in regional development
‡
, some regional authorities have made a concerted effort to 
                                                     
†
 Another significant difference between EU social and regional policy is the national model each adopted. EU 
social policy tends to take a “top-down” approach more likened to the Franco-Italian model, whereas, regional 
policy has a “bottom-up” approach likened to the Irish-British model (White, interview by author, 2003). The 
difference in models certainly makes sense since these policies were initiated by certain member states and thus the 
policy coordination is likewise reflective of those countries’ practices. 
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coordinate regional policy formation and implementation with the EU. Both the Regional Policy DG and 
regional governments have attempted to facilitate better interaction and coordination of regional policies. 
First, regional administrations over time have experienced an institutional learning curve whereby 
bureaucrats and policymakers at the regional level have become more skilled how better to use EU funds 
and to implement EU programs (Dudek 2003). Regional public administrations have created 
administrative units to deal with EU policies and fund distribution. In addition, over time bureaucrats 
have learned about the opportunities available from the EU to promote economic development within 
their region.  
Second, regional governments have established lobbying groups in Brussels. These lobbies 
collect information about current events, programs and issues in the EU and report back to their region. In 
addition, the lobbying groups act as ‘mini-embassies’ to represent the interests of their region at the EU 
level. In Spain, the Basque Country’s attempt to set up a lobbying office in Brussels created a challenge to 
the Spanish constitution. The national government asserted that the creation of a lobby in Brussels was in 
direct violation of the constitution which reserves sole execution of international affairs with the national 
government. The matter was brought before the Constitutional Tribunal.  The Tribunal upheld the Basque 
Country’s right to have an office in Brussels, declaring that international relations with the European 
Union are not exclusive to the state (Article 175/95).  Regional lobbies have since become very common 
in Brussels. 
Some members of the Regional Policy DG, however, suggest that these lobbies do not necessarily 
present new innovative ideas that are not already circulating within the Commission (Petzold, interview 
by author, 2003).  It is difficult to assess the success of regional lobbies in influencing the Commission; 
however, it does provide a “back door” relationship between regions and the EU. Formally, the Regional 
Policy DG meets with regional lobby offices to brief them on current issues. Informally, regional lobbies 
hold seminars for members of the Commission to demonstrate examples of good practice with EU funds. 
This gives Regional Policy DG officials ideas on how to improve policies or how innovation can occur. 
In addition to these seminars regional offices also hold parties that are often well attended and can bring 
the attention of a region to members of the Commission. 
Even members to join the EU in 2004 took the initiative to establish relations among regional and 
national officials with the Commission. There has been variation, however, among the acceding 
countries’ abilities to lobby. One of the more organized and ambitious lobbying efforts came from Poland 
(White, interview by author,  2003). Working with new member states and regions will add to the 
challenge of the Regional Policy DG to coordinate policy implementation and formulation. If these 
governments begin early to understand better the EU and its regional programs it may facilitate enhanced 
policy coordination and implementation.  
Third, informal contacts between the Regional Policy DG and regions also exist to create a 
community of individuals dedicated to regional development. In order to facilitate a network of like-
minded individuals dedicated to regional development, the Commission has attempted to preserve 
informal links with regional actors. The Commission, for example, sponsors seminars on best practice, to 
try to educate regional actors on how to best implement regional policies. The informal links between the 
Commission and regions has facilitated the creation of networks between these levels of government. 
Informal mechanisms have been essential to facilitate the working of established formal mechanisms 
(Meadows, interview by author, 2003).  
                                                                                                                                                                           
‡
 Member states certainly welcome structural funds, but are resentful of the “partnership principle” and the attempt 
to give regions a stronger role. For instance, when discussion of reforming regional development funds occurred 
Spain explicitly pressured for more cohesion funds as opposed to structural funds since cohesion funds travel 
directly to national coffers; thereby strengthening the national government’s ability to distribute funds. 
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Pressure for coordination between regional administrations and the Commission are both explicit 
and implicit. The “partnership principle” certainly sets an explicit goal of coordination, but in practice it 
has not quite achieved as extensive an outcome due to constitutional constraints. Thus, other implicit 
mechanisms have emerged to promote coordination in order to improve the implementation of funds and 
financial management. Links between the regions and the Commission have promoted innovation and 
models of “good practice” that can help other regions. Budgetary pressures within the Commission and 
need for improved oversight have also facilitated the growth of coordination between the Commission 
and regional authorities. Although the effectiveness of coordination has been stunted due to tensions of 
territorial authority with member states, it seems that over time and with institutional learning the 
coordination between regions and the Commission can improve. However, limits on coordination among 
government levels could be exacerbated with the most recent 2007-2013 structural funds program, which 
does not emphasise coordination, but rather greater involvement of national and regional governments 
(European Commission, 2004). If member states and their regions are to have a greater role, this may only 
invite less coordination and more domestic “turf wars” between national and lower levels of government 
regarding creation and implementation of regional policy. 
Reform of regional development policy emerged again in 1993. This reform reinforced the 
components of the 1988 reform, namely subsidiarity and the partnership principle. However, the 1993 
reform emerged also at the time of the anticipation of Maastricht with its creation of EMU and the future 
accession of Finland, Sweden and Norway. In fact Spain threatened to block the passage of Maastricht if 
the EU did not include new cohesion funds and a doubling of structural funds as compensation for joining 
EMU (Morata and Munoz 1996). Spain along with three other small countries, Ireland, Portugal and 
Greece, joined forces to push the EC to expand cohesion policy. The 1993 reform is a reflection of the 
pressure these countries placed on Maastricht negotiations in order to receive a side payment to help deal 
with the projected negative impact of EMU and to simply reach the convergence criteria. Within the 
Maastricht Treaty, not only was there an increase of funds namely the creation of a new fund, the 
Cohesion Fund given to states whose GDP was less than 90percent of the EU average and the fund went 
directly to member states not regions.  The 1993 reform reinforced the main concepts of the 1988 reform, 
but also introduced new measures to improve transparency and simplify the procedures to allocate 
funds(Brunazzo 2010).   
The preamble of the Maastricht Treaty states that, “to continue the process of creating an ever 
closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the 
citizen in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity” (TEU, 1992).  Additionally, Article F calls for the 
EU to respect the identities of its member states. In this way, subsidiarity was reinforced within the treaty, 
which also applied to regional development policy. In addition, the Maastricht Treaty also created the 
Committee of the Regions, a body composed of regional and local representatives, which would consult 
with the Commission regarding structural funds allocation and implementation as well as other regional 
concerns.   
The reforms of regional development funds in 1988 and 1993 with the introduction of the 
partnership principle, attention to subsidiarity as well as increase of funds it appeared that regional 
governments would have a greater role in implementing development policies. In practice EU regional 
policy has had a mixed impact on decentralization across countries and even across regions within 
member states. Some scholars argue that EU regional policy limited the power of national authorities 
(Thielemann 2002) and promoted greater decentralization (Bachtler and Michie 1993; Robert Leonardi 
2006), whereas other argue that constitutional constraints limited the extent to which subsidiarity could 
occur (Dudek 2005; Colino 1996) or that European Regional Development Policy was still too centralized 
at the EU level  (Bachtler and Michie 1993). Edwards (1996) points out that article 3b of Maastricht may 
be unsuccessful at protecting regional governments from the encroachment of national and supranational 
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governments.  He asserts that there is a “tension inherent in subsidiarity …between the rhetoric of 
diversity and the modern impetus toward universality” (Edwards 1996:543).   
 
Fraudulent use of EU funds 
One of the other problems that regions faced regarding implementation of regional development 
policies was the inability of regional administrations to have implementation capacity. Often times as a 
result regions that most needed funds were forced to return unused funds at the end of the five-year 
program cycle (Dudek 2005). Without administrative capacity regional development moneys would have 
little effect on institutional structures or economic and social development.  
Another component of the 1993 reform was to improve transparency and oversight of funds in 
order to avoid the misuse or corrupt use of funds. The number of projects and the large amount of 
territory where these projects are implemented creates a structural distance between EU institutions and 
the actual implementation of EU projects or investments, which makes oversight challenging.  Moreover, 
the disjuncture between the various levels of government increases the likelihood that fraud will take 
place. Kohler-Koch (1995)and Dolz Lago (1996) assert that the Commission does not have the capacity to 
oversee the expenditure of EU money and Dolz Lago (1996) provides examples of fraud in the 
expenditure of EU funds, which goes against the ideals of the “partnership principle”. 
 The Court of Auditors provides some insight as to what allows misuse of funds to occur: 
The fact that the management of projects is entrusted to bodies of which this is not their 
primary purpose and whose administrative structures are not always geared to the 
implementing, monitoring and checking of projects means that it is necessary to lay down 
clear, precise management rules and suitable control mechanisms.  The Court’s inquiries have 
shown that the legal and technical means introduced by the Commission do not ensure the 
control of financial movements and do not make it possible to present the accounting data 
clearly.  This situation makes it difficult or even impossible to ensure effective management, 
monitoring of local or regional joint financing, the overall control of the financial data 
presented in support of applications for interim payments or for payments of the balance and 
do not enable the quality of the results to be safeguarded (Court of Auditors 1996:140) 
 
Adán Nieto Marín (1996) provides some other explanations why member states have not properly 
executed Commission dictated controls and why they have submitted incomplete reports or neglected to 
submit reports.  First, he suggests that states have a lack of Community spirit.  Member states have the 
“impression of [the EU as] artificial, distant and foreign” (Nieto Martín 1996:19; Dolz Lago 1996). 
Fraudulent use of EU money is not perceived as directly harmful to the member states.  Second, states are 
responsible for compensating for improper expenditure, and incorrect use of funds has repercussions for 
the member state. Thus, it is not surprising that member states do not properly report or realize the proper 
controls to combat fraud.  Third, national governments want to obtain as much money as possible for their 
citizens.  This may lead to obtaining funds through false reporting of finances or other irregular methods.  
In this way, various forms of deception are used to gain as much money from the EU as possible.  Fourth, 
the attempts to stop fraud within member states vary according to country.  For example, Nieto (1996) 
points out that Germany and the United Kingdom had the most number of irregularities reported.  This is 
not because they have the most incidents of misusing funds, but rather a greater interest in fighting fraud; 
and this idealism becomes embodied in their juridical organizations.   
 The system of oversight at the national level varies among countries.  The European Parliament 
has recognized deficiency and pointed to the need for improved training of functionaries and better 
exchange between the Commission and member states.  The Court of Auditors points out that in the 
context of EAGGF, the complexity and convoluted nature of the system facilitates fraud.  In addition, the 
Commission does not have the capacity to know if national governments have actually reported all of the 
occurrences of fraud.  The problems associated with national governments as main overseers, to avoid 
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misuse of funds, is further complicated since this responsibility is also shared with sub-national levels of 
government. 
 A significant number of occurrences of fraud with EU funds take place at sub-national levels of 
government (Dolz Lago 1996).  For instance, according to the Fiscal de Salamanca report, conducted in 
1992, Spanish local officials allowed misuse of EU funds.  For example, according to EU stipulations, 
farmers and cattle owners in rural areas must obtain appropriate accreditation to receive EU funds.  Small 
municipalities or certain functionaries of the municipalities are in charge of approving the justification for 
receiving funds and providing the necessary documentation needed for farmers to receive EU aid.  In 
practice, however, local officials do not strong scrutinize requests for accreditation.  Farmers soon realize 
how to maneuver around EU laws and they become familiar with how to misuse funds.  The Fiscal de 
Salamanca’s opinion is that this practice is a form of “picaresque§ that constitutes an authentic fraud of 
the Community” (quoted in Dolz-Lago, 1996:44). 
As part of Agenda 2000, the European Commission proposed a reform of the Structural Funds 
Program for 2000-2006.  The three priorities of the reform are : “ a greater concentration of assistance, a 
decentralized and simplified implementation of the Structural Funds and a strengthening of their 
efficiency and control” (European Commission 1998:3). One of the key differences between the 1994-
1999 program and its successor is the change in monitoring and management of the programs.  The 
Commission’s specific reference to the need for better oversight of structural fund expenditure suggests 
their recognition that moneys may not have been used most efficiently and effectively in the past. 
Although the 1993, 1999 and 2007 reforms of cohesion policy included greater oversight to avoid 
the misuse of funds, fraudulent use has continued. Although subsidiarity was intended to improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the expenditure of structural funds, it has also to some extent facilitated 
corruption and mishandling of funds as lower levels of government execute policies with inappropriate 
oversight. The problem of corruption has been ongoing, but recent enlargements have highlighted the 
situation.  
 
Enlargement 
Another major reform enacted in 1999, streamlined the categories of funding as a way to make 
way for twelve prospective new members, several of which would qualify for funding. Part of the 
growing pains of enlargement and the need for more cohesion funds was the loss of funds to older 
members, which when their regions were compared to those of central Europe, no longer would qualify 
for funds; thus, a phasing out system was created in the 2007-2013 budget.  
Regional development funds historically have been an important part of EU enlargement, but the “big 
bang” of 2004 produced the impetus for another reform of regional development policy to continue in the 
original member states, but to also accommodate the new members. The amount of funds is both 
significant for the EU and the new member states and it became a source of intense controversy during 
negotiations (Hughes, et. al. 2004). Eastern enlargement changed what is considered underdeveloped 
within Europe. For example, objective one regions are those regions that the EU has deemed the most in 
need, falling 75% or less below the EU GDP average. With eastern enlargement, it meant that regions in 
west Europe that once qualified for funds would technically no longer meet the criteria. Spain and 
Portugal would have the most to lose, since they have been significant beneficiaries of ERDP, and would 
not strongly benefit from trade with central European countries due to their geography (Hughes, et. al. 
2004). Moreover, Spain and Portugal, which were once seen as countries with inexpensive labor, would 
                                                     
§
 The notion of picaresque is found within Spanish literary tradition and has become a common theme throughout 
Spain’s political history (Kenny, 1977).  Picaresque means to take advantage of one’s situation and implies 
cleverness and often even illegal behavior. 
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be looked over for even cheaper labor available in central Europe.  As a way to deal with some of these 
issues, as part of Agenda 2000, the EU introduced reforms to prepare for enlargement. The categories of 
funding were streamlined from five to three, eligibility rules were made more stringent and more 
responsibility was delegated to lower levels of government for implementation and monitoring (Brunazzo 
2010).  
The 2007-2013 budget for regional development policy was difficult to negotiate with the 
addition of new member states in 2004 and 2007 and the desire of original fifteen members to maintain 
funds, even though with the EU of 27 certain regions that initially qualified no longer did, and as a result, 
the 2007-2013 budget instituted a phase out for those regions. The 2007-2013 budget allocated 51% of 
total regional spending to central European countries, although they represent less than one quarter of the 
total EU population (European Commission 2013). Again, the categories were revised into three renamed 
objectives: convergence, regional competitiveness and employment, and European territorial cooperation. 
The revision of the categories highlighted the need for innovation, improvement of the environment, 
adaptation to social changes and cross-border cooperation.  
In order for Central European countries to gain membership and receive funding the EU placed 
conditionality. EU conditionality assumes an asymmetrical relationship between new members and the 
Commission, with the Commission setting the rules.  Many scholars suggest that this conditionality has 
had varied impacts across new members (Hughes, et.al. 2004). A conditionality often discussed is the 
EU’s promotion of decentralization as part of the principle of subsidiarity. The CEEC countries were 
mostly unitary systems both prior to and following transition. However, scholars argue that with EU 
regional development moneys and EU conditionality there has been a mixed result (see Hughes et. al. 
2004). For instance in Bulgaria, a weak system of multi-level governance has remained and the central 
government still has remained dominant (Yanakiev 2010). In the case of Romania there have been some 
move toward decentralization, but it has mostly been to access and manage structural funds, but has not 
fundamentally impacted decentralization (Dobre 2010); whereas in the case of Poland there was a greater 
moved toward decentralization (Churski 2008). Although, the Commission promotes subsidiarity and the 
empowerment of regional and local authorities it seems the institutional shift domestically within the 
newer members has not been realized as much as the Commission may have desired. 
 Another less desired outcome of EU regional policy and funding has been the pervasiveness of 
fraudulent use of funds in Bulgaria and Romania. Bulgaria and Romania had funds stopped for certain 
projects as a result of the Commission’s uncovering the mismanagement of funds. Not only were funds 
misused, but there also was difficulty for Romania to absorb much-needed funds (The Economist 2012). 
Romania and Bulgaria’s lack of administrative capacity, understanding of how the EU institutions work 
coupled with corruption has limited the impact of EU regional development policy in these poorest new 
members.  Nonetheless, regional funds in other newer members have contributed to improving regional 
conditions. Yet, regional disparities still persist in central Europe and the post 2013 regional development 
program will see many regions from the original fifteen countries lose funds as regional development 
policy continues to shift its focus eastward. 
 
Conflict of Policies? 
As mentioned earlier, regional policy is territorially based rather than sector in nature. As one 
Commission member points out, there is a DG for Regional Policy, but there is no Council for Regional 
Policy, although there are Councils for Agriculture and Social Policy (Petzold, interview by author, 
2003). Moreover, the regional policies that deal with agriculture and fishing are executed through the 
Agricultural DG, not the Regional Policy DG. Thus, the design, legislating and execution of regional 
policy is not as straight forward as it is with other policy areas that fall more explicitly within sectoral 
boundaries.  
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The re-distributive logic of regional policy is also quite different than the distributive or 
regulatory logic of other sectorally oriented EU policies. The basic premise of regional development 
policy is to use financial mechanisms to re-distribute funds from wealthier to poorer regions.  On the 
other hand, regulatory policies in agriculture, fishing and industrial sectors are examples of policies that 
regulate activities of certain economic sectors.  
Theodore Lowi’s (1964) classic work on public policy helps classify the difference between re-
distributive and regulatory policies. According to Lowi (1964) there are three basic types of policy: 
distributive, re-distributive and regulatory. Distributive policies are distributed on a unit by unit basis in 
such a way that “the loser and the recipient need never come into direct confrontation”(Lowi 1964:690). 
Often distributive policies come in the form of log rolling or pork barrel politics, thus each actor receives 
something, and therefore there is little conflict between winners and losers (Lowi 1964; Pollack 1994). 
Redistributive policies, on the other hand, have identifiable winners and losers, whereby 
resources are transferred from the haves to the have-nots. The key ingredient of these policies is that not 
only are there winners and losers, but there is also a social class component involved. Resources are 
allocated from one group with greater resources and given to another that has fewer resources. Although 
the distinction between winners and losers is clear it is often seen as legitimate since it includes social 
consciousness and is likened to a “Robin-Hood” inspired policy.  
Similar to redistributive policies, regulatory policies also create visible winners and losers. The 
basis for regulatory policy decisions, however, is not based on socio-economic considerations, but rather 
the conditions of a specific economic sector. Regulatory policies are “rules issued for the purpose of 
controlling the manner in which private and public enterprises conduct their operations” (Giandomenico 
1999:9). Industries involved in an economic sector are affected in the same way; and thus are legally 
treated equally. It is important to emphasize, however, that only businesses within a certain sector gain or 
lose as a result of regulatory policies. 
Within the domestic realm government regulatory policy can be difficult since it is clear “who 
will be indulged and who deprived” (Lowi 1964:690-691). Since costs and benefits are concentrated 
organized interests will place pressure on government officials making it often times politically difficult 
for governments to pass far reaching regulatory policies (Wilson 1973). On the other hand, and more 
relevant to European values, redistributive policies can be seen as legitimate and less problematic since 
they contain a component of social-consciousness (Tsoukalis 2003). 
Lowi’s typology, however, was based upon domestic politics. How are these same kinds of 
policies decided at the EU level, and how do they interact with one another? Mark Pollack (1994) 
explains that the decision making process for different kinds of policies in the EU differ depending on the 
decision making rules and types of bargains necessary to approve legislation. Since decision-making 
differs across policy types there seems to be insufficient mechanisms to coordinate these policies and 
consideration for the impact one policy type may have upon another. Relevant to our discussion is mainly 
the interaction of redistributive and regulatory policies, which include competition policy. 
Regulatory policy is also seen as necessary to ensure the success of the single market. At the EU 
level, regulatory policies are an attempt to make Community wide regulations upon public and private 
entities. Scholars suggest that with deeper integration grew a functional need for greater EU involvement 
in regulatory policy to achieve the free market (Giandomenico 1996; Pollack 1994). As a result, 
competency for regulatory policy has been partially reallocated to the EU level.
**
 Since EU legislation 
                                                     
**
 Reallocation of regulatory policy from the national level to the EU level is the type of policy reallocation the 
multi-level governance model suggests occurs with European integration. 
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supersedes domestic law
††
 this also means that member states must concede autonomy in the field of 
regulatory policy. 
Regarding competition policy, which was key to ensuring the completion of the single market, the 
EU instituted de-regulation and limits on the role of member states to institute protectionist policies, such 
as state subsidies. For instance, member states were not allowed to provide subsidies to failing industries, 
as they had done in the past. Usually, failing industries are also concentrated within a particular territorial 
area. Thus, competition policy’s limit of state subsidies had a territorial effect since these industries tend 
to be concentrated in certain regions such as boat construction and steel manufacturing. At the same time 
the EU was limiting national subsidies, the EU was also sending subsidies to regions in the form of 
regional development funds. Thus, competition policy and regional development policy operating under 
different logics ended up counter-acting one another. As some suggest, the goals of competition policy 
often trump those of cohesion (Thielemann 2002; Petzold 2003). Competition policy is premised on the 
supposition to allow the market to work freely and thereby letting the market solve development 
problems; whereas, regional development policy assumes the need for state intervention to remedy 
regional economic disequilibria.  
Similar counteraction also occurred in other regulated sectors. For instance, regulatory policies 
such as milk and fishing quotas had a territorial impact on certain poorer regions dependent on agriculture 
and/or the fishing sector (Dudek 2005). Under the logic of comparative advantage often times economic 
sectors are geographically concentrated and as a result regulations can also have an important territorial 
impact. Thus, although EU regulatory policies are intended to impact certain policy sectors, they can 
unintentionally negatively impact certain regions that regional policy is intended to help.  
 
Conclusion 
 EU Regional development policy has evolved over time. Initially, the program was created 
simply to meet the demands of British enlargement, but later become a necessary instrument to ease the 
transition to EU membership for new poorer members of the Union. Overtime the program has been 
modified to improve implementation and to streamline the categories of which regions and projects would 
qualify for funding. In particular, the 1988 reform introduced the partnership principle, an attempt to 
include subsidiarity into the application of regional development policy. Later reforms attempted to 
expand the notion of subsidiarity and as a result the EU ended up promoting institutional decentralization 
to different degrees within member states.  
 The enlargement of Spain and Portugal significantly expanded ERDP and set the stage for the 
role that ERDP would play for the major expansion of the EU in 2004. The “big bang” meant a re-
distributing of funds from older members eastward. As a result the 2007-2013 programs became a 
compromise between the needs of central European new members and the continued need of the original 
fifteen. Cohesion policy remains a key component to enlargement, both new and old members have been 
found to misuse funds. In the cases of Romania and Bulgaria, misuse of regional development funds 
became so prevalent that all funds were stopped.  
 It seems that although fraud is one problem that detracts from achieving the goals of EU regional 
development policy, the conflicting logic underlying other EU policies can also work to counter ERDP’s 
positive effects. ERDP is based upon the logic of re-distribution, whereby those with more resources pay 
and those with less resources benefit. Regulatory policy also consists of winners and losers and often 
times the policy has unintended territorial affects that work counter to ERDP. Moreover, EU competition 
policy, one type of regulatory policy and key to creating the single market, is based upon letting the 
                                                     
††
 European Court of Justice decisions, specifically Costa vs. ENEL (1964) and Simmenthal vs. Commission (1978) 
established the supremacy of EU law to national law. 
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market regulate itself to solve development problems, whereas, ERDF is based upon the supposition that 
the market cannot solve developmental problems alone. Competition policy is based upon stopping 
government subsidies to failing industries, whereas, ERDP is about subsidizing failing regions. In the end 
however, competition policy usually wins out (Thielemann 2002).  
 The success of ERDP is hard to measure since it is not clear which factors have had an impact on 
development in certain regions (Leonardi 2006). There is certainly anecdotal evidence of improved 
infrastructure, environmental and rural conditions and many other positive tangible changes. However, 
cohesion, which is the goal of the policy, has still not yet been achieved.  
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